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Introduction
In January 2010, a California Assembly Committee passed Assembly 
Bill 390, entitled the Marijuana Control, Regulation, and Education Act.1
                                                                                                                 
∗ Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2011; Bachelor of 
Arts, Santa Clara University 2007.  Many thanks to Professor Erik Luna for his guidance and 
support throughout the research and writing process of this Note. 
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This successful committee vote signified the first time any legislative body 
in the United States had passed a bill to fully legalize marijuana.2  When 
Assembly Bill 390 sputtered due to missing a filing deadline, it was 
reintroduced as California Assembly Bill 2254,3 which was later approved 
to appear on the November 2010 ballot as Proposition 19.4
This ballot initiative’s mission was to: 
[R]emove marijuana and its derivatives from existing statutes defining 
and regulating controlled substances.  It would instead provide for 
regulation by the Department of Alcoholic Beverages of the possession, 
sale, cultivation, and other conduct relating to marijuana and its 
derivatives . . . by persons 21  years of age and older . . . .5
Unlike decriminalization,6 the California initiative would essentially 
legalize marijuana in the same fashion as alcohol.7  Ironically, California, 
along with Utah, was the first state to prohibit marijuana, creating 
antimarijuana laws in 1915.8  By putting Proposition 19 to vote on the 
November 2010 ballot, California stood poised to bring the treatment of 
marijuana in this country full circle. 
Yet, on November 2, 2010, the voters of California disrupted such a 
sea change by voting against legalizing marijuana by a margin of 7.8% 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Steve Harmon, Committee Passes Marijuana Legalization Bill, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2010. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Alison White, Bill to Legalize, Regulate Marijuana Reintroduced into State 
Assembly, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 22, 2010, available at http://www.contracostatimes. 
com/california/ci_14447365?nclick_check=1 (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 4. Jessica Bennett, Taking the High Road, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26, 2010, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/03/25/taking-the-high-road.html (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 5. Marijuana Control, Regulation, and Education Act, Assemb. B. 2254 (as 
introduced by Ammiano, Feb. 18 2010) [hereinafter Marijuana Control Act], available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_2251-2300/ab_2254_bill_20100 
218introduced.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 6. See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS:  DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS 268 
(1992) (stating that decriminalization "means leaving production and distribution of the drug 
entirely illegal, but removing criminal penalties—that is, the threat of arrest and trial, though 
not necessarily the threat of monetary penalty—for possession for personal use"). 
 7. See Marijuana Control Act § 1(i) (stating the intent of the legislature to "impose a 
set of regulations and laws concerning marijuana comparable to those imposed on alcohol"). 
 8. RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIHUANA 
CONVICTION:  A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (1974). 
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points.9  Although, for the time being, this vote stalled the legalization of 
marijuana, the issue is hardly dead and the likelihood of marijuana 
becoming legal, at least on the state level, will only increase with time.10
Moreover, California’s initiative, even though defeated, has already 
symbolized the opening of the floodgates of state-level marijuana 
legalization and the unraveling of a century of American prohibition.11
The prompting of this legal revolution comes largely from 
growing resentment toward federal and state governments’ costly war 
on drugs.12  Governments commit billions of dollars each year to 
stymieing drug use and drug flow, and the amount increases every 
year.13  Further, in the last decade, the percentage of money allocated 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Mark Harper, Chart:  Prop. 19 Fails, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, available 
at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/wire/la-me-pot-g,0,1060478.graphic (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 10. Proposition 19 failed largely because its strongest supporters, voters between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-five, minimized their representation by not showing up to vote.  
Assuming such persons maintain their support for marijuana legalization and assuming that 
persons vote with more likelihood as they grow older, the fate of a future legalization bill 
rests on solid ground. See John Hoeffel, Youth Vote Falters; Prop. 19 Falls Short, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-pot-
20101103-1,0,5135592.story (noting that while voters aged twenty-five and younger did not 
vote in high numbers, marijuana legalization legislation is likely to return to the California 
Ballot in 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 11. See id. (reporting that legalization proponents in Washington, Oregon, and 
Colorado are planning similar measures for their respective 2012 ballots); see also Sandra 
Chereb, New Initiative to Regulate Pot Use Filed in Nevada, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 7, 2010, 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=9500241 (reporting that legis-
lators in Nevada, following California’s lead, filed a similar bill to legalize and regulate 
marijuana) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); 
see also Kurt A. Gardinier, Washington State Voters Support Taxing and Regulating 
Marijuana, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT BLOG (Jan. 18, 2010), http://blog.mpp.org/tax-and-
regulate/washington-state-voters-support-taxing-and-regulating-marijuana/01182010/ 
(reporting that "54 percent of Washington [state] voters support taxing and regulating 
marijuana like alcohol, and selling the natural plant in state-run liquor stores [and 
that] . . . [in December 2009] Washington state legislators submitted a bill to tax and 
regulate marijuana like alcohol") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 12. See generally Virtually Legal; Drugs, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 14, 2009 (U.S. 
Edition) ("[S]tretched budgets and a general weariness with the war on drugs have made 
prohibition harder to enforce."). 
 13. See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
NAT’L DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY:  FY 2009 BUDGET SUMMARY 13 tbl.3 (Feb. 2008), 
available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/09budget/fy09bud-
get.pdf (showing that from 2002 to 2009 the federal funding for drug prevention increased 
from $10.8 billion to $14.1 billion annually). 
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to law enforcement has grown yearly while the percentage of money 
allocated to drug abuse prevention and research has contracted.14  Of 
this money, funding toward marijuana prevention represents 
approximately twenty percent of the total funds.15  Adding even more 
weight to the criticisms against spending, law enforcement and 
interdiction against marijuana has proved largely inefficient.  For 
instance, the Office of Management and Budget, in its most recent 
assessment, graded the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) a mediocre 
"adequate."16  While the DEA earned a one hundred percent score for 
its purpose, it only received twenty-six percent for its results.17  Yet, in 
the face of such exorbitant spending and less-than-stellar law 
enforcement efforts, marijuana use in this country seems to be more 
popular than ever, represented by the 25,085,000 individuals aged 
twelve and older who used marijuana in 2007.18
Strangely, the general populace, who is obviously familiar with 
the use of marijuana, stands ignorant of the quasi-racism, xenophobia, 
and class oppression that lace the history of marijuana prohibition in 
this country.  Another source of general ignorance is the fact that the 
continuation of marijuana prohibition has severely inhibited the growth 
of American racial and ethnic minority communities by 
disproportionately arresting and imprisoning their youth.  In the face 
of the first potentially successful marijuana legalization movement in 
this country, it is highly important for minorities to grasp the history of 
marijuana and the possible effects of its legalization.  It is the purpose 
of this Note to examine the racial aspects of both the history and status 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See id. (showing that the law enforcement budget jumped from 54.4% to 65.2% from 
2002 to 2009, while the drug abuse and research budget contracted from 45.6% to 34.8% during that 
period). 
 15. See JEFFREY A. MIRON, THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF MARIJUANA 
PROHIBITION 10 (2005), available at http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/MironReport.pdf 
(finding that in 2003 approximately $2.6 billion of $11 billion was directed at marijuana 
prohibition, despite the federal government’s unwillingness to break down its funding per 
drug). 
 16. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PROGRAM 
ASSESSMENT RATING TOOL:  PROGRAM SUMMARIES 254 (2005), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/ap_cd_rom/part.pdf. 
 17. Id.
 18. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., NATIONAL DRUG 
THREAT ASSESSMENT, MARIJUANA 17 (2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL DRUG THREAT 
ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs 31/31379/31379p.pdf; see also 
JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., HIGH SOCIETY 119 (2007) (finding that "95 million Americans 
have tried [marijuana], 25 million in [2004] alone"). 
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quo of marijuana prohibition to inform and to illuminate how a future 
state initiative, using California’s Assembly Bill 2254 as a model, 
would affect present day minority communities. 
I.  When Marijuana Was Marihuana, the "Killer Weed" 
In the context of narcotics law, the first decades of the twentieth 
century culminated in the federal Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, completing a 
blitzkrieg across the United States that, while not technically criminalizing 
marijuana, created financial sanctions so outrageously expensive they might 
as well have been criminal.  As one scholar explains: 
Under the [Marihuana Tax Act], any person cultivating, transporting, 
selling, prescribing or using marijuana had to be registered and pay a tax 
levy of one hundred dollars an ounce every time the drug changed 
hands.  For industrial use, the level was set at one dollar an ounce.  To 
give this some perspective, the price of a brand-new Ford Model-Y 
saloon car in 1937 was $205.  In theory, the Act was a piece of revenue 
legislation and any infringement a tax violation not a narcotics one.  Yet 
the aim was clear:  to control the social use of marijuana.  In effect, it 
was a prohibition and unconstitutional in that the substance itself was 
not proscribed, just made all but inaccessible by repressive taxation.19
Unfortunately a racist and xenophobic path stifled the route taken to 
this destination.  Mexicans and West Indians first brought marijuana into 
this country through the Southwestern and Gulf states, respectively, in the 
early 1900s.20  Along with the immigrating Mexicans and West Indians, 
African Americans and lower class whites primarily used marijuana.21
Violent crime, largely induced by alcohol prohibition, obsessed the United 
States at this time, and because the majority white population automatically 
associated minority racial and socio-economic groups with criminal 
activity, the majority immediately presumed marijuana to be addictive, 
dangerous, and representative of evil.22  Resulting from this 
(mis)conception, from 1914 to 1933 thirty-three states criminalized 
marijuana use for nonmedical purposes.23
                                                                                                                 
 19. MARTIN BOOTH, CANNABIS:  A HISTORY 156 (2003). 
 20. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 8, at 32. 
 21. Id. at 52. 
 22. See id. (noting that the American public viewed crime as a symptom of marijuana 
use and marijuana use a symptom of minority groups, including whites of the "underworld"). 
 23. See id. at 32 (stating that marijuana "encountered a hostile political and social 
climate.  Gradually during the ensuing quarter-century, criminal prohibitions appeared on 
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The vast increase of Mexican immigrants into the Southwestern states 
and the fear and resentment felt toward them and their culture by whites 
largely drove the antimarijuana platform.24  The white population 
"exhibited considerable distaste for the new immigrants and their different 
habits of life[,]" and marijuana use exhibited one such habit.25  This fear 
and dislike was extreme, placing "the Mexican . . . in the same position as 
the Negro in the South."26  Thus, this country’s original and immediate 
disdain for marijuana was not positioned against its mental or physical 
effects, but towards the ones using it—minority groups.27  Interestingly, 
whites did not represent the only group disdaining marijuana for its lower 
class associations; wealthy Mexican-Americans viewed marijuana use as a 
badge of the inferiority of blacks.28
It should be noted that it was not completely unfounded to associate 
marijuana with crime.  Although socially the authorities viewed marijuana 
as a "minority" habit and thus a taboo habit, marijuana came under legal 
fire because law enforcement found it associated with criminals and those 
viewed as morally reprobate.29  However, use of marijuana and criminal or 
immoral acts, as critics today point out, do not necessarily have a causal 
connection, meaning that an association with crime does not necessarily 
prove a cause of crime.30  Yet, because authorities already socially 
associated marijuana with lower class minorities, its legal association with 
criminality quickly attached to those minorities, and the people believed 
                                                                                                                 
the statute books of nearly every state where the drug was used"); see also id. at 51 (noting 
that from 1914–1931 marijuana was prohibited in twenty-nine states, and four more did so in 
1933). 
 24. See id. at 38–39 (noting that practically every state west of the Mississippi River 
prohibited marijuana due to the great influx of Mexican immigrants in the first thirty years 
of the twentieth century). 
 25. Id. at 45. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 36 (stating that "[c]lass consciousness was a recurrent element in 
marihuana prohibition even in its infancy"). 
 28. Id.
 29. See id. at 34 (stating that "[a] drug with such obnoxious properties soon attracted 
the attention of law enforcement officials . . . ."); see also id. at 43 ("The first market of 
white users were prostitutes, gamblers, pimps, and addicts"). 
 30. See, e.g., Judy Mann, Misguided Laws Make Marijuana Deadly, WASH. POST,
May 23, 2001, at C15 ("Marijuana itself does not induce violence . . . .  What produces the 
violence associated with marijuana is that it is illegal. The same dynamic caused the 
murderous Capone-style violence during Prohibition. And once Prohibition was repealed, 
the violence associated with the bootleg trade vanished, although the gangsters that it 
spawned did not."). 
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"tales of its destructive effects" without question.31  Lawmakers therefore 
classified marijuana as a narcotic, unlike its counterpart drugs, alcohol, and 
cigarettes.32
The medical establishment, holding a much more inquisitive and much 
less inquisitorial perspective, complained that the illegalizing of marijuana 
was unfounded.  The pharmaceutical drug industry in particular voiced that 
"cannabis was an insignificant medicine which had no place in antinarcotics 
legislation."33  Unfortunately, their arguments were either never heard or 
never stated with significant conviction, and marijuana in the early 1900s 
found its destiny carved out by the bigotry, racism, and fear the majority 
harbored against racial and ethnic minorities.34
Yet, even though marijuana had been prohibited in many states by the 
1930s, the general public did not view it as a national concern.  But with the 
onset of the Great Depression, Southwestern states began pressuring for 
federal marijuana prohibition as a method of deporting "job-stealing" 
Mexican migrant workers.35  To do so, marijuana needed a sensationalized 
portrayal as a critical, national threat.36  In California, in 1935 the leader of 
the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies wrote, "Marijuana, perhaps 
now the most insidious of our narcotics, is a direct by-product of 
unrestricted Mexican immigration.  Easily grown, it has been asserted that 
it has recently been planted between rows in a California penitentiary 
garden.  Mexican peddlers have been caught distributing sample marijuana 
cigarettes to school children."37  Such localized proclamations, by 
themselves, failed to rile-up federal legislation.  To do so would take an 
effort backed by a federal agency. 
Harry Anslinger, commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
(FBN) has become somewhat mythologized as the man who single-
                                                                                                                 
 31. Id. at 37. 
 32. See id. at 51 ("[A]lthough use of some drugs—alcohol and tobacco—was 
indigenous to American life, the use of  narcotics’ for pleasure was not.  Evidently, drugs 
associated with ethnic minorities . . . were automatically viewed as  narcotics.’"). 
 33. Id. at 48. 
 34. See id. at 51 ("The scientific community shared this social bias and therefore had 
little interest in scientific accuracy."). 
 35. See BOOTH, supra note 19, at 148 ("[A]nti-Mexican attitudes . . . were streng-
thened during the Depression when jobs were scarce and migrants were seen to be stealing 
work from the white work force.  The Mexicans were accused, without any justification, of 
spreading marijuana across the nation."). 
 36. Id.
 37. Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
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handedly outlawed marijuana in this country.38  Even if he did not solely 
"instigate anti-marijuana policies or prohibition, . . . he did master mind a 
very efficient national campaign that was to do much to determine public 
attitudes towards marijuana . . . over three decades."39  Racist, fear-
mongering tactics supported the backbone of his campaign. 
Upon taking the job as commissioner of the FBN, Anslinger did not 
regard marijuana as a threat.40  It was only when Congress cut the FBN’s 
budget that Anslinger began his crusade of marijuana demonization.41
Marijuana, a drug already resented for its foreign origin, provided the 
perfect mechanism for Anslinger to push for federal legislation.42  Federal 
laws would allow the FBN’s arrest rate to rise, thereby increasing its clout 
as a federal agency deserving of federal funds.43
For the purposes of this Note, the end result of Anslinger’s crusade, 
the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, stands less important than how Anslinger 
went about passing it.  To pass this legislation, Anslinger exploited the 
country’s fear of minorities.  Anslinger "regularly linked marijuana to 
unwelcome minorities.  He wrote of ‘ginger-colored niggers’ using pot, an 
ethnic evil he viewed ‘as hellish as heroin.’  He told Congress that half the 
country’s crime stemmed from ‘Mexicans, Latin Americans, Filipinos, 
Negroes and Greeks whose civic aberrations flowed directly from 
marijuana use.’"44 Although Anslinger faced outrage at his racist comments, 
his rhetoric remained powerful enough to maintain congressional and 
public support and keep him in office.45  Headlines spanned the nation 
sensationalizing marijuana, making it synonymous with minorities and 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See John F. Galliher & Allynn Walker, The Puzzle of the Social Origins of the 
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, 24 SOC. PROBS. 367, 374 (1976–77) (concluding that Harry 
Anslinger has been repeatedly characterized as the lone man responsible for illegalizing 
marijuana at the national level, even though other forces besides him were at work). 
 39. BOOTH, supra note 19, at 144. 
 40. Id. at 147. 
 41. See id. at 149 ("In order to boost his organization Anslinger had to find a new 
target—a new drug menace—upon which to peg a budget increase."). 
 42. See id. (stating that marijuana represented an easily exploitable target for 
Anslinger to attack because of its predominant use by minorities and foreigners). 
 43. See id. at 150 (noting how a positive public perception of the FBN would increase 
its budget). 
 44. RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA:  DRUG POLICY REFORM AND 
PROHIBITION POLITICS 19 (2004) (internal citations omitted). 
 45. See BOOTH, supra note 19, at 150 (noting that Anslinger survived protests from 
black community leaders "only because of his support base of editors, hardline congressmen, 
and some senior pharmaceutical industry figures"). 
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violence.46  As Martin Booth explains, "[Anslinger] had by his ranting 
alienated a large section of the ethnic-minority population of the USA 
which was, marijuana aside, largely law abiding.  This in turn caused them 
to become secretive and closed." 
When it came time for Congress to enact marijuana legislation, it 
turned to Anslinger, a charlatan expert with a political agenda, rather than 
an unbiased scientific body.47  During the committee hearings Anslinger’s 
testimony relied on newspaper articles and hearsay accounts reporting 
crimes and tragedies claimed to have been caused by marijuana.48  Notably, 
a significant portion of this shady evidence occurred in newspapers owned 
by William Randolph Hearst, who had a sizable financial interest in the 
illegalizing of marijuana.49  In fact, the Hearst papers contributed to the 
association of marijuana and minorities by replacing the non-volatile term 
"hemp" with the alien-sounding word "marihuana."50  Anslinger’s only real 
opposition at the hearings came from the well-respected lawyer-physician, 
Dr. William C. Woodward, legislative counsel to the American Medical 
Association.51  Dr. Woodward sharply criticized the reliance on unverified 
newspapers accounts and called for a nonpartisan scientific body to perform 
a true investigation of the drug.52  Yet, Congress dismissed Dr. 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See, e.g. id. at 151 (" Murders, slaughtering, cruel mutilations, done in cold 
blood, . . . much of this violence [is attributed] to what some experts call marihuana . . . .  
Those addicted . . . lose all restraint, all inhibitions.  They become bestial demonics, filled 
with a mad lust to kill . . . ." (quoting Universal News)); see also id. (noting the presumption 
that a murderer in Colorado was on marijuana simply because he was a "Spanish-speaking 
person, most of whom are low mentally, because of social and racial conditions"). 
 47. See JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA:  REPORT OF THE INDIAN HEMP DRUGS COMMISSION 
1893–1894, at v (1969) (introduction) ("Instead of appointing an impartial commission to 
determine the facts, [Congress] permitted . . . the Bureau of Narcotics, to act as an advocate 
for the bill in a setting which lacked either the informed judgment of an expert body or the 
many guarantees of reliability which are built into our adversary system."). 
 48. Galliher & Walker, supra note 38, at 371. 
 49. See GERBER, supra note 44, at 7 (explaining that Hearst’s extensive forest holdings 
would become the paramount west coast paper supply with an eradication of hemp, its main 
competitor). 
 50. BOOTH, supra note 19, at 148. 
 51. Galiher & Walker, supra note 38, at 360. 
 52. See Taxation of Marihuana:  Hearing on H.R. 6385 Before the Committee on 
Ways and Means, 75th Cong. 92 (1937) (statement of Dr. William Woodward) ("The 
newspapers have called attention to it so prominently that there must be some grounds for 
their statements.  It has surprised me, however, that the facts on which these statements have 
been based have not been brought before this committee by competent primary evidence."). 
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Woodward’s arguments, and the bill easily became an act, and marijuana 
suddenly found itself effectively criminalized at the national level.53
Could this have happened if the irrational and racist fears of the 
American public had not been exploited through the press?  If marijuana 
use would have been accepted by the majority as compatriot to alcohol use, 
would it have remained legal?  With legislators in California and other 
states so recently instigating the movement to legalize marijuana, minority 
groups should recognize prohibition’s history and understand its genesis of 
racially-motivated sensationalism and hysteria.  Because minority groups 
were deeply rooted in the prohibition of marijuana, such groups should re-
root themselves in the origins of its legalization. 
II.  The Whitening of Marijuana 
From the passing of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 to the late 1960s, 
marijuana slinked away from national attention and became a drug little 
used and little publicized.54  During World War II, for industrial purposes 
the federal government even issued a "Grow Hemp for Victory" campaign 
recognizing the cannabis plant’s myriad industrial uses.55  In the 1960s 
marijuana use expansively grew, yet a White House poll in May of 1969 
showed that only three percent of Americans saw drugs as an important 
national issue.56  The increase in use did however signify a 
change:  marijuana use was no longer a minority-only habit; it had spread 
beyond the Mexican and black populations, outsourcing ever-rapidly, and 
becoming the drug of choice for the white youth of America.57  With this 
whitening of marijuana use, the image of marijuana as the "killer weed" 
began to capitulate as did much of the already sparse scientific backing for 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See BOOTH, supra note 19, at 155 (explaining the passage of the Marihuana Tax 
Act, and noting that rather than voting, Congress passed the bill by "the teller 
system . . . whereby congressmen walked past a teller who counted the number of people 
going by him," illustrating the ease of its passage). 
 54. See, e.g. WILLIAM H JAMES & STEPHEN L. JOHNSON, DOIN’ DRUGS:  PATTERNS OF 
AFRICAN AMERICAN ADDICTION 83 (1996) (noting that from 1939 to 1940, less than two 
hundred people were arrested in New York City for possession and use of marijuana). 
 55. See BOOTH, supra note 19, at 159–60 ("Approximately twenty thousand farmers in 
the Midwestern states were registered under the federally funded War Hemp Industries 
Corporation to cultivate over 30,000 acres of cannabis producing 42,000 tons of fibre and 
180 tons of seed annually throughout the war years."). 
 56. DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW:  RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 93 
(2007). 
 57. Id. at 96. 
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its prohibition.58  America’s youth started recognizing marijuana as an 
"American drug," and then, because a majority demographic found out they 
actually liked the drug’s effects, battle cries sounded-out for its legalization. 
President Lyndon Johnson’s Commission on Crime concluded that 
drug abuse policy "often tends to discriminate against the poor and 
subcultural groups in the population."59  Yet, President Johnson did not 
remain in office long enough to follow through with any action to fix such 
discrimination, and left marijuana use simply as another youthful 
indiscretion deserving of punishment.60  But with whites enjoying pot, 
marijuana could no longer be synonymous with minority violence, rage, 
and lawlessness, risking destruction of the prohibition’s very foundation. 
So a new portrayal grew, and marijuana found itself symbolizing a 
new minority—the cultural rebel.61  Office-seeking politicians now used 
marijuana as the symbolic destroyer of American values, creating an 
antidrug platform to present themselves as worthy leaders of America 
upholding a moral order.62  Further exemplifying the symbolic change, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation—still under its staunch founding leader, J. 
Edgar Hoover—arrested marijuana users, not because of any cognizant 
violent or criminal propensities, but because such arrestees were also often 
liberals, war protesters, and cultural deviants.63
By the 1970s when Richard Nixon took office, marijuana use had 
continued increasing, especially among college students, and could hardly 
remain classified as a "minority drug."64  Nixon’s core political base, the so-
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id.
 59. DAVID SADOFSKY BAGGINS, DRUG HATE AND THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 89 (1998) (quoting Commission on Crime). 
 60. See id. (" If the rest of the society wears short hair, the member of the youth 
culture wears his hair long.  If others are clean, he is dirty.  If others drink alcohol and 
illegalized marijuana, he denounces alcohol and smokes pot . . . by all these means, he 
declares himself an alien in a large society with which he is fundamentally at odds.’" 
(quoting President Johnson’s Commission on Campus Unrest)). 
 61. See JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF MARIHUANA:  POLITICS 
AND IDEOLOGY OF DRUG CONTROL IN AMERICA 144 (1983) (explaining the "hippie 
hypothesis," and that "[m]arihuana became a symbol—an embodiment of the 
Counterculture . . . for policymakers and the media as well as for rebellious youth"). 
 62. See BAGGINS, supra note 59, at 89 ("As the cultural challenge of the counter-
culture failed, criminalization of their rebellious drug choice, marijuana, became politically 
savvy.  Drugs became the means to criminalize the culture that challenged dominant 
orthodoxy."). 
 63. PROVINE, supra note 56, at 99. 
 64. See id. at 97 (explaining the Nixon Administration’s view that the "problem was 
that drug use had moved out of the ghetto and into the suburbs, where harsh penalties were 
ruining promising young lives and creating disrespect for the law"). 
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called "silent majority," was "angry at hippies, women’s liberation activists, 
pot smokers, Black nationalists, and other rebellious elements."65  Yet, 
because so many college students now used marijuana—and many of them 
the children of his political base—it was not feasible for Nixon to maintain 
measures that would continue putting thousands of such students at risk of 
incarceration.66  Therefore in 1970, Nixon urged Congress to pass the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (CDAPCA), an act 
which abrogated mandatory minimum sentences,67 allowed minor criminal 
offenses to be stricken from records, and made first-time possession of 
marijuana a misdemeanor.68  While the CDAPCA represented a mitigating 
step for Nixon’s "whitening" of marijuana use dilemma, the Act also joined 
marijuana with the classes of controlled substances subject to strictest 
control—a classification scientifically unfounded, but socially acceptable.69
While the Nixon administration confronted the whitening of marijuana 
use legally, social explanation was still needed.  In other words, how could 
a drug once accredited with causing insanity, terror, and superhuman 
strength in Hispanics, blacks, and Asian Indian users be causing 
mellowness, introspection, and an overbearing appetite in its white users?  
Instead of unverified newspaper accounts proclaiming the most recent tale 
of a marijuana-induced lunatic,70 legitimate scientific studies emerged with 
colorful quotes of marijuana users such as this:  "See, people I know, after 
they got hip to weed, they just climbed out of the rowdy trip.  They squared 
off completely, you know, wanted to jump sharp, enjoy themselves and be 
mellow instead of getting all brutalized . . . ."71  Even the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics—the very same agency responsible for the marijuana plus 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 98. 
 66. Id.; see also GERBER, supra note 44, at 19 (reporting that from 1965 to 1970 
marijuana arrests rose from 18,000 to 188,000). 
 67. Although the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, through its exorbitant fines, effectively 
criminalized marijuana production, sale, and use, the 1951 Boggs Act provided technically 
criminal penalties.  Most states copied this act, and its offspring, the Narcotics Act of 1956.  
See HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 61, at 23 (explaining the progression of federal marijuana law 
from the early 1900s to the 1960s). 
 68. See PROVINE, supra note 56, at 98 (explaining the enforcement provisions of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act). 
 69. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 202(a)(c), 84 Stat. 1236, 1247–49 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 812(a)(c) (2006)) (classifying marijuana as a drug that has "a high potential for 
abuse, . . . no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, . . . [and] a 
lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision"). 
 70. See generally BOOTH, supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 71. See HERBERT BLUMER, ADD CENTER PROJECT FINAL REPORT:  THE WORLD OF 
YOUTHFUL DRUG USE 30 (1967) (internal quotations omitted). 
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minority equals horrific crime equation—had changed its antimarijuana 
rhetoric to a more realistic form, associating the drug with sloth rather than 
violence.72  The Ford Administration maintained the Nixonesque symbolic 
argument against marijuana use, particularly committing the country to 
becoming a national example for drug enforcement in the hopes of curbing 
the influx of marijuana from abroad.73
But when President Carter took office, pot—until the year of this 
writing—came the closest ever to being legalized.  In his first year in office, 
President Carter addressed Congress concerning the ballooning arrest rate 
for marijuana users:  "Penalties against possession of a drug should not be 
more damaging to an individual than the use of the drug itself . . . . 
Nowhere is this more clear than in the laws against possession of marijuana 
in private for personal use."74  By his second year in office two out of three 
of this country’s young adults had used marijuana.75  Further, by end of 
President Carter’s term of office eleven states had passed some form of a 
marijuana decriminalization law.76  But the silent majority that swayed 
Nixon, again found its voice, gnashing its teeth at Carter’s proposal to 
remove criminal punishment for small possession of marijuana.77
Significantly, as Provine explains, this majority was "indifferent to the 
problems of inner-city drug use and addiction."78
If the majority was indifferent in the 1970s, in the 1980s, with Ronald 
Reagan as president, it became vindictive.  Reagan’s stance invoking the 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See PROVINE, supra note 53, at 99 (noting that the FBN "no longer portrayed 
[marijuana users] as criminal, but rather as troubled and emotionally unstable, suffering from 
lack of motivation and alienation . . . . [I]ts officials stressed the potential for marijuana to 
serve as a gateway to more serious drug use"); see also BOOTH, supra note 19, at 253 ("A 
new phrase entered the anti-marijuana vocabulary:  amotivational syndrome, a scientific-
sounding phrase for feeling alienated and being lethargic as a result of using marijuana"). 
 73. See RICHARD J. BONNIE, MARIJUANA USE AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 124 (1980) 
[hereinafter MARIJUANA USE] (noting that the Ford Administration declined to endorse 
marijuana law reform to prevent other countries from doubting the American commitment to 
drug prohibition). 
 74. Jimmy Carter, Drug Abuse Message to the Congress, Aug. 2, 1977, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7908 (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 75. See PROVINE, supra note 56, at 99 ("By 1979, over two thirds of the nation’s 
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds had tried marijuana at least once."). 
 76. KLEIMAN, supra note 6, at 268. 
 77. See PROVINE, supra note 56, at 99 (listing "newly formed white, middle-class 
parents’ groups like the Parents’ Resource Institute for Drug Education . . . and the National 
Federation of Parents for Drug-Free Youth" as examples of Carter’s opposition). 
 78. Id. 
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war on drugs illustrated one of his strongest platforms and helped him attain 
his presidential nomination.79  In his first year in office he initiated stringent 
sentencing requirements for drug offenses—including simple marijuana 
possession—and also introduced a bevy of collateral sanctions for drug 
users.80  Illustrating how involved marijuana remained, in Reagan’s first 
speech initiating the war on drugs, pot stood alone as the only drug 
specifically mentioned.81
The accomplishments of this war:  over the twenty-four year period 
from 1970 to 1994 federal penitentiaries exploded in their holding of drug-
related offenders from sixteen percent to sixty-two percent.82  As one 
scholar explains the logic of the drug war:  "Bad culture was the root cause 
of poverty, and so prison coupled with welfare reduction became essential 
domestic policy."83  And, as the nonpartisan National Commission of 
Marihuana and Drug Abuse found, these very drug laws imposed racial and 
class oppression.84
III.  The Present Day Costs of Marijuana Prohibition 
As John Kaplan notes regarding the worthiness of a law, "the two 
crucial questions are:  (1) what are the total social and financial costs 
attributable to the law, and (2) what are the benefits that flow from this 
outlay?"85  The costs of illegalization have been grave—both on a general 
social level and on how they have affected minorities specifically. 
A.  Generally, Marijuana Prohibition Has Not Worked 
As the historical study of marijuana illegalization has illustrated, 
marijuana prohibition is an American oddity in that "[n]o other law is both 
                                                                                                                 
 79. BOOTH, supra note 19, at 254. 
 80. See id. (documenting Reagan’s creation of the White House Drug Policy Office 
and its many intolerant drug reforms, including the reintroduction of mandatory minimum 
sentencing and a sentencing schedule for marijuana offenders ranging from as little as 
probation to as harsh as life imprisonment). 
 81. BAGGINS, supra note 59, at 160. 
 82. BOOTH, supra note 19, at 254. 
 83. BAGGINS, supra note 59, at 89. 
 84. Id.
 85. JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA:  THE NEW PROHIBITION 1 (1970) [hereinafter THE NEW 
PROHIBITION]. 
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enforced so widely and harshly and yet deemed unnecessary by such a 
substantial portion of the populace."86  Marijuana is the nation’s third most 
popular drug, behind only alcohol and tobacco, with American users 
approaching 100 million in number.87  Yet, marijuana, unlike legal 
alcoholic or tobacco-related vices, is a drug with very limited physical 
health risks.88  At least one study has shown that marijuana use during 
pregnancy, while not good for fetuses, is not as bad for them as alcohol or 
cigarettes.89  In effect, this country has prohibited a drug that, at least 
physically speaking, does not put individuals at high risk, nor mark them 
out as noticeably different than nonusers.90  Yet, using this drug remains 
criminal, and hundreds of thousands of individuals are fined, incarcerated, 
and criminally sanctioned for their individual choice to use it.  Ironically, 
drugs much more dangerous than marijuana, while not freely legal, are 
available through a pharmacy, and lack such a carte blanche incarceration 
threat.91
That the increasing number of arrests has had ostensibly no 
diminishing effect on use rates also demonstrates the failures of current 
marijuana prohibition law.92  This "disappointing reality"93 is not just sad, 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Ethan A. Nadelmann, An End to Marijuana Prohibition:  The Drive to Legalize 
Picks Up, NAT’L REV. Jul. 12, 2004 at 1, reprinted in Ethan A. Nadelmann, DRUG WAR 
DEADLOCK 221 (2005). 
 87. THE NAT’L ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS, www.norml.org (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 88. See BAGGINS, supra note 56, at 72 (noting that there have been "zero fatalities in 
medical history for marijuana use"); see also About Marijuana, THE NAT’L ORG. FOR THE 
REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS, http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=7305 (last 
updated Nov. 7, 2010) ("Marijuana is far less dangerous than alcohol or tobacco.  Around 
50,000 people die each year from alcohol poisoning.  Similarly, more than 400,000 deaths 
each year are attributed to tobacco smoking.  By comparison, Marijuana is nontoxic and 
cannot cause death by overdose.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 89. Bram Zuckerman et al., Effects of Maternal Marijuana and Cocaine Use on Fetal 
Growth, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 762, 764 (1989). 
 90. See MARIJUANA USE, supra note 73, at 24 ("[M]ost marijuana users and marijuana 
offenders as well, are not in need of treatment in any sense and are in fact indistinguishable 
from their peers in all respects other than their marijuana use.  The vast majority of 
marijuana users do not use the drug heavily . . . ."). 
 91. See CALIFANO, supra note 18, at 120 ("There are numerous addictive drugs—
opioids and central nervous stimulants and depressants—[which have been authorized for 
use] by the Food and Drug Administration approval process."). 
 92. See id. at 124 ("[F]rom 1993 to 2005, a 107 percent increase in marijuana arrests 
was accompanied by a 100 percent increase in marijuana users."). 
 93. Id. 
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but bizarre, as is any argument that arresting marijuana users will contribute 
to the greater fight against other, harder drugs.94  Further, at least one study 
has shown that criminal prosecution and incarceration does nothing to treat 
drug use—including that of marijuana—because using drugs is often 
caused by childhood or personal maladjustment, rather than a characteristic 
classic of criminal behavior.95  And therein lies an even greater 
irony:  "while marijuana laws are primarily designed to protect drug users 
from themselves, arrest and criminal justice processing is for many users 
the most substantial risk of using marijuana."96  Moreover, if prison is not a 
bad enough consequence for use or possession, a person convicted of 
growing marijuana may face even harsher collateral sanctions.97
Underscoring all of this is the fact that marijuana-related arrests far 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See Nadelmann, supra note 86, at 223–24 (conjecturing that "[trying] to reduce 
heroin addiction by preventing marijuana use . . . is like trying to reduce motorcycle 
fatalities by cracking down on bicycle riding"). 
 95. See Jonathan Shedler & Jack Block, Adolescent Drug Use and Psychological 
Health:  A Longitudinal Inquiry, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 612, 618 (May 1990) ("[T]he 
frequent [drug] users appear to be relatively maladjusted as children.  As early as age 7, the 
picture that emerges is of a child unable to form good relationships, who is insecure, and 
who shows numerous signs of emotional distress.").  As an interesting side note, this study 
found these qualities in the childhood personalities of those who abstained from using drugs: 
[R]elatively fearful and anxious, using and responding to reason, not physically 
active, not vital or energetic or lively, inhibited and constricted, not liking to 
compete, not curious and open to new experiences, not interesting or arresting, 
physically cautious, neat and orderly (implies fussiness), anxious in 
unpredictable environments, not having a rapid personal tempo, looking to 
adults for help and direction, not responsive to humor, not self-assertive, not 
self-reliant or confident, shy and reserved, . . . cold and unresponsive, 
immobilized under stress, obedient and compliant, not calm or relaxed, planful 
and likely to think. 
Id.  While one might wonder if the abstainers’ childhood personalities aren’t a bit 
maladjusted, comparing the two at least evidences that childhood disposition tends to 
predate the future decision to use drugs.  This is a considerable finding in light of the fact 
that the choice to use drugs is an autonomous choice to hurt oneself rather than others:  we 
have criminalized a choice that is not only a self-immolating choice, but one that is possibly 
predisposed through one’s childhood experiences. 
 96. KLEIMAN, supra note 6, at 268; see also BAGGINS, supra note 59, at 74 
("[H]owever bad some illegal drugs may be for some people, prison is almost certainly 
worse.").  It should also be noted that the then newly-elected President Carter used this same 
rationale when he attempted marijuana law reform in the late 1970s.  See Jimmy Carter, 
supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 97. See RICHARD G. BOIRE, CENTER FOR COGNITIVE LIBERTY & ETHICS, LIFE 
SENTENCES:  THE COLLATERAL SANCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH MARIJUANA OFFENSES 4–5
(2007) (finding that the collateral sanctions attached to a conviction for growing marijuana 
could be worse than those attached to a murder, rape, or robbery conviction). 
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outnumber arrests for other drugs—with simple possession being the 
dominant sin earning an individual a battle with the court system.98
Finally, current marijuana prohibition has diverted money into the 
hands of criminal drug dealers and by doing so has increased the potential 
for violence in our communities.  The illegal drug business—particularly 
that of marijuana—is enormously profitable, reaching the hundred billion 
dollar mark in the 1990s.99  With so much money at stake, it is no wonder 
more and more individuals become attracted to the drug trade, which 
maintains the flow of illegal drug consumption and sales, lowers the price, 
and makes it even easier for users to get their fix.100  Even marijuana, a drug 
thats user is generally passive, has become a major source of violence 
because its seller is not generally passive, but dangerous and violent.101
B.  The Cost of Prohibition on Minorities 
While racial and ethnic minorities no doubt feel and experience the 
above general failures of the marijuana prohibition, these groups, 
particularly African Americans, are affected much more acutely than the 
white majority.  This quote is powerfully illustrative:  "In South Africa in 
1993, under apartheid, they incarcerated 851 black males per 100,000.  In 
the United States in 2004 under [marijuana] prohibition, we incarcerated 
4,919 black males per 100,000.  How anyone could look at this and not see 
institutionalized racism, I don’t know."102  In 2008 only eleven percent of 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See  Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008 Crime in the United States:  Arrests for 
Drug Abuse Violations (Sept. 2009), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/arrests/ 
index.html (showing that 82.3% of drug arrests were for possession, while only 17.7% were 
for sale/manufacturing.  For possession, marijuana arrests were the clear majority at 44.3%.) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  For 
sale/manufacturing arrests, marijuana was second to heroin and cocaine, being only 5.5%. 
Id.  The percentages do not equal 100 because of rounding. 
 99. See John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War:  The 
National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 556 
(1991) (noting an estimated range of $80 to $100 billion in illegal drug sales per year). 
 100. See id. ("The profitability of the drug trade has attracted more dealers, a 
phenomenon that, when joined with the sustained flow of drugs into this country, has 
actually lowered the price of many drugs.") (internal citation omitted). 
 101. See BAGGINS, supra note 59, at 75 ("Even the most passive drug, marijuana, 
becomes a source of violence when prohibition causes the growers and distributors to 
become criminal.  Thus as Campaign Against Marijuana Production (CAMP) targeted 
growers in Humboldt County, flower-children growers were replaced over time with armed, 
production aggressive-minded entrepreneurs."). 
 102. Marijuana Prohibition & Minorities, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT,
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white arrests were for drug related offenses, while fifteen percent of black 
arrests were for drug offenses.103  Further, approximately twenty percent of 
blacks receive jail time for their drug arrest, while only fifteen percent of 
whites are imprisoned for their drug arrest.104  These statistics would all be 
fine and normal if the user percentages matched up.  But they do not.  The 
simple truth is that blacks get arrested almost three times as frequently as 
whites for marijuana possession offenses, while the user rates between the 
two groups stand close to equal.105  Clearly then, the current status of 
marijuana laws affecting the minority communities in general, and the 
black community in particular, reflects a disadvantageous and unfair 
system. 
Yet some argue that although the statistics show a disparity in arrest 
and incarceration rates for marijuana and drug-related offenses favoring 
whites over minorities, the disparity does not necessarily mean unfairness.  
For example, Rudolph Gerber provides that one possible explanation for the 
disparity is "because of [minorities’] concentration in inner cities and their 
relative scarcity on college campuses.  These factors help explain why 
white high school and college-age students compose the highest number of 
pot users, but inner-city blacks and Hispanics compose the most numerous 
arrestees." 106  Yet, these arguments cannot overcome the actual difference 
in who gets arrested for committing the same acts, nor can they fix the 
devastating harm caused by the incarceration of thousands of individuals of 
a community.107  As one scholar argues, "Selective prohibition would have 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/download-materials/Minorities-Brochure_1106.pdf (quoting 
Norm Stamper, former Seattle police chief) (emphasis added). 
 103. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008 Crime in the United States:  Arrests by 
Race, tbl.43 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_43.html 
(showing that 452,590 of 3,015,905 total arrests of black individuals were for drug related 
offenses, while only 829,432 of 7,382,063 total arrests of white individuals were drug-
related) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 104. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison Inmate Characteristics, tbl.11 (2005), 
available at  http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1572 (showing that 15.4% 
of whites are incarcerated for their drug offenses, while 22.5 percent of blacks are 
incarcerated for theirs). 
 105. See Rajeev Ramchanda et al., Racial Differences in Marijuana-Users’ Risk of 
Arrest in the United States, 84 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 264, 264 (2006) (noting that 
African Americans are 2.5 times more likely than whites to be arrested while having nearly 
identical user rates). 
 106. GERBER, supra note 44, at 63. 
 107. Essentially Gerber’s argument communicates the idea that white "[p]arents who 
used the drug in the late 1960s and the late 1970s often see smoking pot as a benign rite of 
passage, a phase they passed through on their way to becoming business executives, lawyers, 
doctors, and teachers."  CALIFANO, supra note 18, at 120.  These ideas explain that high 
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vanished long ago if whites had been sent to prison for drug offenses at the 
same rate as blacks . . . .  It is an objectionable compromise of enacting 
criminal laws against drug use for everyone, while enforcing them more 
vigorously in poor communities."108
It is no surprise then that the advocates for decriminalization have 
grown.  As of this writing, thirteen states have laws on their books making 
possession of marijuana in small amounts for personal use a merely finable 
offense.109  That number will likely rise because decriminalization is so 
facially attractive in that it saves state governments high amounts of 
money.110  In fact, the states that decriminalized marijuana during the Carter 
administration managed to have their laws escape Reagan’s drug war 
largely because not arresting people for possession did not clearly affect use 
or other drug-related problems, while the police did clearly save money.111
Yet national decriminalization is hardly the answer, particularly for 
minority groups.  Even if arguing that decriminalization would not increase 
the use rate, one must still recognize that decriminalization would still not 
lower the illegal and dangerous supply networks.  Because these networks 
predominately poison minority communities, for minorities 
decriminalization represents the "worst of all possible policies."112
                                                                                                                 
school and college is when and where whites consume the drug, and therefore get arrested 
less because those locations are less likely to attract policeman.  Unlike those students, 
blacks and Hispanics live in poor, urban environments where police officers are more likely 
to patrol, thus more likely to arrest.  This is a legitimate rationalization for why there is an 
arrest/user rate disparity—but it does nothing to show that the disparity is not highly unfair.  
It simply attaches the likelihood of being punished for an illegal act to the environment you 
happened to be born into. 
 108. DOUGH N. HUSAK, LEGALIZE THIS! THE CASE FOR DECRIMINALIZING DRUGS 135–
36 (2002).
 109. See States that Have Decriminalized, THE NAT’L ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF 
MARIJUANA LAWS, http://norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=6331 (last updated Nov. 8, 2004) 
(showing that Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Oregon have all decriminalized 
marijuana) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 110. See, e.g., Virginia:  Hearing Tomorrow on Decriminalization Bill, MARIJUANA 
POLICY PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/states/virginia/alerts/virginia-hearing-tomorrow-on.html 
(reporting that Virginia legislators in January 2010 introduced a decriminalization bill for the 
purpose of saving the money used to charge and possibly sentence individuals arrested for 
small marijuana possession). 
 111. See KLEIMAN, supra note 6, at 269 (noting that one factor allowing for the survival 
of state decriminalization laws was the lack of evidence showing those laws caused more 
marijuana consumption or other associated problems). 
 112. See KLEIMAN, supra note 6, at 2 ("Adding more demand to a multibillion-dollar 
illicit industry will have disadvantages:  more untaxed income, more economic activity 
outside legal control, and probably more corruption and violence."). 
576 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST.  557 (2011)
Moreover, if use rates instead increased, decriminalization in doing nothing 
to destroy or fight the criminal organizations supplying marijuana would 
increase those organizations’ profits.113  A higher use rate under a 
decriminalized regime is not just likely but inevitable because 
decriminalization would eliminate the group of non-users who have 
refrained from using simply out of a fear of punishment.  If that fear no 
longer has basis, then those non-users would no longer have a reason for 
abstaining.   More users equals more profits, and because decriminalization 
bats an eye at the criminal organizations absorbing those profits, minorities 
would be faced with not only the same criminals besetting their 
communities, but financially strengthened ones.114  While decriminalization 
may clear out the jails and prevent many minorities from being introduced 
to jails in the first place, minority groups would do well to consider whether 
increasing the wealth of criminal organizations is an acceptable side effect. 
IV.  Is Legislation such as California’s Marijuana Control Act the Answer 
for Minority Communities? 
The Marijuana Policy Project, perhaps the largest and most organized 
of all marijuana advocacy groups, makes these arguments for the 
legalization of marijuana in reference to minority groups: 
Drug abuse is a real problem for minority communities. But our 
current marijuana laws haven’t helped — they’ve simply clogged 
our courts and jails with people of color.  By taxing and 
regulating marijuana similarly to alcohol, we would: 
Make our communities safer. Removing marijuana from the 
criminal market would free up law enforcement resources so 
police can focus on serious and violent crimes.  
Reduce teen marijuana access. Unlike drug dealers, licensed 
vendors would work to prevent teens from buying marijuana—
just as states that have implemented strict controls on underage 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., Risks and Prices:  The Role of User Sanctions in 
Marijuana Markets 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13415, 2007) 
(arguing that decriminalization would do "nothing to remove the criminal networks, it may 
increase their profits"). 
 114. Robert Robb, It’s Time to Consider Legalizing Marijuana, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 5, 
2007, at 137 available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/opinions/articles/1005 
robb05.html ("[R]emoving criminal sanctions for drug use won’t dismantle the destructive 
and dangerous criminal supply networks that have taken deep root . . . in the United States.") 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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tobacco purchases have seen sales of tobacco to minors fall 
dramatically. 
Save taxpayer dollars and generate revenue. Each year, the 
government spends $7.7 billion to arrest and lock up nonviolent 
marijuana users. Taxing marijuana would generate billions in tax 
revenues instead of profits for drug dealers.115
Others accompany these three arguments, such as the call for 
legalization to repair the fragmented and broken relationship between law 
enforcement officials and minority groups.116  The idea that legalized 
marijuana will keep young men out of jail in minority communities is 
another argument raised.117  Notably, however, none of the proponents of 
these arguments seems able to confidently argue that legalization of 
marijuana will not drastically increase the use of marijuana.  As Mark 
Kleiman—a proponent of a qualified form of legalization—explains:  "The 
serious question is not whether an increase in consumption would occur, 
but how large it would be and how much of it would reflect new heavy 
use."118  For the white majority, a spurt in marijuana use may not cripple its 
population.  Minority groups, however, should conduct serious inquiry into 
exploring what a higher use rate would mean for their communities and 
future.  Otherwise, legalized marijuana might risk becoming the twenty-
first century "gin" of the lower classes.119  Highlighting the gravity of this 
problem, "marijuana legalization has one very serious drawback:  virtual 
irreversibility if it goes badly wrong."120
                                                                                                                 
 115. Marijuana Prohibition & Minorities, supra note 102. 
 116. See HUSAK, supra note 108, at 136 ("Repairing negative attitudes about law and 
authority among blacks is among the foremost challenges facing criminal justice policy in 
the twenty-first century.  Ending prohibition would be a major step toward alleviating racism 
in the criminal law."). 
 117. See id. at 184 (noting that African American leaders such as Jesse Jackson are now 
denouncing the drug and marijuana prohibition because it has imprisoned so many of the 
black community’s young). 
 118. KLEIMAN, supra note 6, at 274. 
 119. See Editorial, The Case for Legalisation:  Time for a Puff of Sanity, THE 
ECONOMIST, Jul. 28, 2001, reprinted in DRUG WAR DEADLOCK:  THE POLICY BATTLE 
CONTINUES 129 (questioning how to get from the current state of prohibition to a state of 
legalization and warning that if it is not done carefully, legalization could have effects 
comparable to the disastrous impact of gin on the British in the 18th century).  Also, in light 
of the comparison to alcohol is the example of the prohibition of alcohol in the United States 
in the early 20th century.  By now, almost everyone—scholar and lay person alike—agree 
that Prohibition was a foolish act.  However, what is highly relevant here is that if use rate is 
the measure of success, alcoholic prohibition was by no means a failure.  See HUSAsupra
note 108, at 159–60 (comparing alcoholic prohibition to marijuana laws). 
 120. KLEIMAN, supra note 6, at 275. 
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A.  Productivity Concerns 
The first area of concern for minorities regarding a higher 
consumption of marijuana within their communities is the association of 
marijuana use with lower productivity.  If minority groups need anything, it 
is more opportunity for more productivity for further advancement, growth, 
and welfare.  While some studies debate marijuana’s general effect on 
productivity, minority groups’ overall lower income makes them more 
vulnerable in this area, largely negating the general conclusions of those 
arguments.121  Although not necessarily damaging the brain, marijuana use, 
particularly acute consumption, retards logical thinking, reasoning, and 
complex thought.122  Further inhibiting effects, such as lesser hand-eye 
coordination, weaker driving performance, less ability to concentrate, and 
diminishing learning rates all relate to marijuana use.123
What does all this mean?  It is hard to determine.  As noted, one of the 
strongest arguments for the repeal of marijuana prohibition is to get the 
thousands of minority persons locked up for petty possession back into their 
communities.  But assuming those returning keep using the drug, and 
considering the probability that legalization will increase use elsewhere, for 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, COSTS OF ABUSE, COSTS OF CONTROL 14–15 (1989) 
[hereinafter COSTS OF ABUSE] (listing incompetence, vulnerability, escalation, misbehavior, 
and poverty as the five reasons "one person’s marijuana smoking may be more harmful than 
another’s" (emphasis added)); see also JAMES & JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 66 ("For many 
African Americans, marijuana represents a way of masking the pain of poverty, oppression, 
lack of hope, and lack of opportunities.  Many African Americans try to fill the spiritual 
emptiness in their lives with the medicating effect of marijuana and other drugs.").  That 
noted by James & Johnson seems similar to the situation of the wealthy prescription drug 
addicts, addicted to pills for the same depressing reasons.  But while those financially 
solvent groups can "afford" to continue their addiction, low income minorities will have no 
such wealth as their crutch. 
 122. See JAMES & JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 66 ("[M]arijuana diminishes the left brain 
functions of logical thinking, reasoning, and rational processes and increases the right brain 
functions of emotions, creativity, and introspection.  Marijuana also affects the ability of 
users to read and comprehend written material."); see also COSTS OF ABUSE, supra note 121, 
at 10 ("At the time of use, marijuana causes measurable deterioration in the ability to 
concentrate, to process complex information, and to coordinate eye and hand.  Some studies 
have shown these effects persisting for months after extended periods of very heavy 
marijuana use, but none have shown permanent loss of function."). 
 123. See CHARLES R. SCHWENK & SUSAN L. RHODES, MARIJUANA AND THE 
WORKPLACE:  INTERPRETING RESEARCH ON COMPLEX SOCIAL ISSUES 18 (1999) ("Most 
experiments have shown that marijuana intoxication reduces subjects’ attention or 
concentration on tasks, their speed at learning new material and their short-term memory."); 
see also COSTS OF ABUSE, supra note 121, at 11 ("There is no doubt that marijuana impairs 
driving performance, and does so more than the average user is conscious of."). 
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minority groups, the effect of higher use on productivity should be of 
utmost concern.  It is a tradeoff, but is it a valuable one? 
For instance, one study finds that marijuana use does not substantially 
impair individuals’ ability to perform general working tasks, but does 
impair them as far as managerial favor, raises, promotions, and the like.124
Indirect effects such as these could severely inhibit the workforce and 
overall production of minority groups, by stunting their ability to move up 
the chain of responsibility and command.  Further complicating this is the 
fact that with the legalization of marijuana, individuals would have less 
incentive to hide their habit, making it all the more easier to suffer 
remaining stigmatizing social consequences.125  Compounding the problem 
is that in the legalized world "[e]ach new user would be at some risk of 
progressing to heavy, chronic use . . . ."126
B.  What About Potency Regulation? 
As shown, legalization of marijuana will almost certainly create a 
higher rate of consumption and create a higher demand for the drug.  What 
has not been discussed is the level of potency in marijuana and the ever-
increasing demand for stronger pot.127  Not only does stronger marijuana 
have repercussions related to the productivity effects discussed above,128
but it also creates a situation possibly undermining one of the main 
rationales for legalization—the lowering of drug-dealing related crimes.129
                                                                                                                 
 124. See SCHWENK & RHODES, supra note 123, at 136 (finding the effect of marijuana 
use on work cannot be easily quantified in monetary terms, but "[i]f nonsmokers are 
consistently selected on the basis of alleged reliability or manageability over smokers for the 
most lucrative jobs, it would not be surprising if they failed to produce and earn more"). 
 125. See KLEIMAN, supra note 6, at 271 ("It would be possible that smokers of legal 
marijuana would be less wary about letting their intoxication be seen, and therefore more apt 
to make nuisance of themselves, than today’s smokers of illegal marijuana."). 
 126. Id. at 274. 
 127. See NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 18, at 18 ("According to 
law enforcement reporting, marijuana producers have consistently increased the average 
potency of marijuana through improved cultivation techniques . . . to meet rising demand for 
higher-potency marijuana."). 
 128. See CALIFANO, supra note 18, at 121 (noting how modern marijuana is much 
stronger than the marijuana of the 1960s and 1970s, having more potential to cause physical 
and mental harm); see also id. at 122 (commenting that stronger marijuana has—although 
only in rare cases—proven to be addictive). 
 129. In fact "making our communities safer" is listed first in the MPP’s arguments for 
why marijuana legalization would be helpful to minorities.  See generally Marijuana 
Prohibition & Minorities, supra note 102. 
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California’s initiative, while claiming to regulate marijuana, was silent 
on how it planned to oversee the regulation of potency in legal marijuana 
growth.  Because the bill planned to regulate marijuana in the manner of 
state regulation of alcohol, it can be assumed that those "licensed to grow 
and distribute" marijuana commercially would eventually face some sort of 
underlying potency regulation.  Yet, the bill also would have legalized the 
individual growth of marijuana for personal consumption.130  On the black 
market, marijuana increases every year in its potency.131  If an eventual 
potency regulation curbed average marijuana potency, declining its strength 
and then leveling it out, it would be like the government slowly taking hard 
liquor off the market, leaving only beer and wine.  But unlike alcohol, 
marijuana is much easier to produce or, colloquially speaking, to 
moonshine. 
The scenario would result in either individuals growing their own 
personal marijuana at the potency level they like, or individuals going 
elsewhere—elsewhere meaning illegal drug dealers—resulting in an illicit 
market for marijuana all over again.  While it is argued that the legalization 
of marijuana would mean "virtual abolition of the black market, with its 
associated violence and corruption,"132 a weaker legalized drug incapable of 
competing with the strength and high of its illegal sibling seems pointless.  
The California bill indicated that by legalizing marijuana it would put the 
criminal networks out of business.133  Those would have been empty words 
if in the legalized world illegal business continued to market a superior 
product.  While majority group marijuana proponents may have little worry 
of such an offshoot higher-potency black market product, minority groups, 
those already dealing with the brunt of the crime, corruption, and violence 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See Marijuana Control Act § 11725(b) (stating that for persons twenty-one years 
of age or older "[m]arijuana may be cultivated only in a location in the home or yard in 
which the marijuana is not visible from any public place"). 
 131. See NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 18, at 18 ("According to 
University of Mississippi Potency Monitoring Project (PMP) data, that average THC (delta-
9-tetrahydrocannabinol) content in tested samples of marijuana in 2007 increased to the 
highest level ever recorded—9.64 percent in 2007, rising from 8.77 in 2006" and only 3.48 
in 1985."). 
 132. KLEIMAN, supra note 6, at 270. 
 133. The Act specifically provided that by being enacted it would "deprive the criminal 
market of revenue derived from the cultivation, smuggling, and sale of marijuana . . . [and 
would] reduce the violence associated with the criminal market for marijuana."  Marijuana 
Control Act §§ 1(d), (e). 
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of drug dealers, should be extremely careful that the proposed legalization 
does not simply spawn new, competing black market drug operations.134
C.  The Money Drain from Minority Communities 
Much is made by the proponents of marijuana legalization concerning 
marijuana’s potential to become the next "cash crop" creating billions of 
dollars in both sales and tax revenue.135  Particularly in the face of 
decriminalization proposals, which do nothing to divert money from the 
hands of drug dealers, legalization makes sense.  The argument goes 
something like this:  as history has shown, marijuana use will not stop; 
therefore, we might as well sell the drug legally, putting the money from 
drug dealers’ wallets into those of the people.136  Although this is generally 
a sound and sensible argument, for minority groups it might truthfully 
represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their 
communities. 
In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over 
$4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound.137
As noted earlier, marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Mark Kleiman argues that "[I]llicit marijuana of known provenance, potency, and 
freedom from adulteration would have a competitive advantage over black-market marijuana 
as long as the prices were comparable, so there would be little need to undercut current illicit 
prices as part of the anti-moonshining effort . . . ."  This answers why legal marijuana would 
have a price advantage over illegally grown and distributed marijuana, but it does nothing to 
answer the problems arising with the potency advantage illegal marijuana would likely 
maintain over its legal counterpart.  Noting the indisputable trend of increase in marijuana 
demand correlating with the increase in demand for higher potency marijuana, it is 
extremely hard to imagine that potency demand would subside with the opportunity to pay 
less for a weaker drug simply because it is legal. 
 135. See, e.g., Jon Gettman, Marijuana Production in the United States, THE BULLETIN 
OF CANNABIS REFORM 3 (2006) ("Marijuana is the largest cash crop in the United States, 
more valuable than corn and wheat combined.  Using conservative price estimates domestic 
marijuana production has a value of $35.8 billion."). 
 136. See id. at 4 ("As America’s federal, state, and local governments strive to fund 
important services such as transportation, education, law enforcement and homeland security 
untaxed and unregulated domestic marijuana cultivation and distribution remains both an 
increasing challenge to policymakers and an untapped source of revenue for legislatures."). 
 137. See NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 18, at 19 (reporting that the 
"wholesale price for domestic high-potency marijuana ranges from $2,500 to $6,000 a 
pound . . . while the wholesale price for midgrade marijuana is approximately $750 a pound, 
according to the Los Angeles County Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse 
(LACRCIC)"). 
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annually.138  As also noted, the highest concentration of drug dealers is 
found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling.139
These figures tend to reflect that billions, and at the very least hundreds of 
millions, of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each 
year.  With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers 
will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will 
drain.  Meaning, will the billions or hundreds of millions of dollars continue 
their current flow into lower income communities, or will forces divert the 
money elsewhere? 
The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the 
growing140 and the selling141 of marijuana.  To the detriment of minorities, 
these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of 
business prowess:  cultivating or growing marijuana would require 1) a 
maximum license fee of $5,000 paid by all applicants to "reasonably cover 
the costs of assuring compliance with the regulations to be issued";142 2) all 
license applicants to submit to a criminal history background check;143 3) 
appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the 
financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security";144 and 4) 
compliance with other employment,145 inspection,146 and recordkeeping147
measures.  These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance 
to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital. 
Therefore, marijuana, if legalized in the California fashion, while 
becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, 
could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See generally Powell & Hershenov, supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 139. See generally supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 140. See Marijuana Control Act § 3-26020(a) ("The department shall license 
commercial cultivators of marijuana."). 
 141. See id. § 3-26040(a) ("The department shall license marijuana wholesalers, who 
shall be allowed to package and prepare marijuana for sale, and who shall be authorized to 
sell marijuana to licensed sales outlets."). 
 142. Id. §§ 3-26020(a), 3-26040(a). 
 143. Id. §§ 3-26020(b), 3-26040(b). 
 144. Id. §§ 3-26030(a), 3-26050(a). 
 145. See id. §§ 3-26030(b)-(d), 3-26030(b)-(d) (establishing employment rules to 
restrict persons under twenty-one years of age from accessing or transporting marijuana, and 
to ensure that marijuana is not consumed on the premises). 
 146. See id. §§ 3-26030(e), 3-26050(e) (requiring an appropriate inspection and 
tracking system for marijuana sold in compliance with the Revenue and Taxation Code). 
 147. See id. §§ 3-26030(f), 3-26050(f) (requiring "[r]ecordkeeping consistent with the 
regulatory needs of the department"). 
A LITTLE BIT OF HISTORY REPEATING 583 
financial means and business savvy to initiate such production.  Worsening 
this dilemma, most of the money flowing into the minority communities 
from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts 
of the new class of "marijuana businessman."148  Minority community 
leaders should be mindful of this potential money drain, and wary of its 
wide range of effects on their communities.149
D.  Federal Collateral Sanctions Would Still Exist with State Legalization 
Still, considering the impact greater marijuana use poses for the 
minority community, marijuana would continue to remain illegal under 
federal law.  The California initiative wiggles past this federal hazard by 
stating its intent to "prevent state and local agencies from supporting any 
prosecution for federal or other crimes relating to marijuana that are 
inconsistent with those provided in this bill."150  However, a wholesale 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Alcohol advertising provides a further harrowing analogy of the potential harm 
legalized marijuana will bring to minority groups regarding the flow of money. 
In the face of the [American Medical Association’s] concern about vulnerable 
populations, alcohol merchants target blacks, who suffer disproportionately from 
higher rates of alcohol-related death, disease, and injury, and the rapidly 
growing Latino community.  In San Francisco, 31 percent of billboards in 
neighborhoods of Latinos advertise alcohol, as do 23 percent in those of 
African-Americans, compared to only 12–13 percent in those of whites and 
Asian-Americans.  There are also more liquor licenses granted in black and 
Latino city neighborhoods than in white ones[.] 
CALIFANO, supra note 18, at 148.  Since alcohol is advertised so disproportionately in 
minority communities, it is logical to predict that marijuana advertising would be conducted 
similarly.  Therefore not only would there be a flow of the money spent on marijuana in 
minority communities into pockets elsewhere, but the unequal advertising and promotions  
in minority communities would exacerbate the cycle. 
 149. See, e.g., id. at 144 ("To set the stage for an accommodating presidential 
administration, big tobacco—led by Philip Morris, the top donor, R.J. Reynolds, and Brown 
and Williamson—pumped almost $17 million into the 2000 Republican campaign in support 
of George W. Bush."). This important incidental political effect of legalized marijuana sales 
revenue actually has the potential for benefiting minority groups.  Liberal groups are the 
biggest proponents of legalization thus there is potential that they will be the first ones to 
profit from it.  However, just because these groups are left-leaning, does not guarantee that 
they will sympathize with minority issues.  Further, just because these groups support 
marijuana legalization does not mean they will be the first groups to profit from it as a cash 
crop.  Would a conjecture that the first groups to farm marijuana would be those companies 
already farming and marketing tobacco not be entirely reasonable?  If so, that would mean 
historically right-leaning companies such as Philip Morris would be the first ones to stick 
their hands in the pot. 
 150. Marijuana Control Act § 1(k). 
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stoppage of state pursuit of marijuana violations will not render federal 
prosecution obsolete.  In fact, the current federal stance reflects no 
intention of quitting its attack on marijuana offenses.151  Thus, if state 
legalization instigates higher general use, then there will be that many 
more potential run-ins with federal law.  While this obviously implicates 
the concerns with arrests and sentencing noted above, the collateral 
sanctions of a federal marijuana conviction—even if for a misdemeanor—
can be hard.  For minorities in particular the same sanctions can be 
devastating. 
First, a run-in with federal law could effectively disable potential job 
applicants.  An arrest—even without conviction—might be enough to 
prevent employers from hiring an applicant.152  Furthermore, even if 
marijuana is legal on the state level, because few employers ask what the 
arrestee’s offense was, any sort of "it was just marijuana possession" 
excuse will not necessarily earn employer sympathy.153  Further, for any 
job requiring a license, professional or occupational, a possible 
consequence for even a misdemeanor conviction could be ineligibility.154
Because a share of the job market is so absolutely crucial for the growth 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See David W. Ogden, Memorandum for Selected United States 
Attorneys:  Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of 
Marijuana, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN. 1 (Oct. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf ("The prosecution of signifi-
cant traffickers of illegal drugs, including marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug 
manufacturing and trafficking networks continues to be a core priority in the Department’s 
efforts against narcotics and dangerous drugs, and the Department’s investigative and 
prosecutorial resources should be directed towards these objectives."); see also Hoeffel, 
supra note 10 (reporting that United States Attorney General Eric Holder "pledged to 
‘vigorously enforce’ federal narcotics laws whatever California did"). 
 152. See BOIRE, supra note 97, at 8 (noting that arrestees face the obstacle of a denial of 
employment regardless of conviction). 
 153. See MARIJUANA USE, supra note 73, at 30–31 ("Consider further the empirically-
demonstrated consequences of criminal conviction in the private sector:  many employers 
will not even consider applicants with a prior criminal record; and even if there is no per se 
exclusion, most employers systematically hire persons without criminal records in 
preference to persons with such records."). 
 154. See id. at 30 ("Possible loss of, or ineligibility for professional licenses (e.g. 
medicine, dentistry, law); possible loss of, or ineligibility for industrial or other occupational 
licenses (e.g. nursing, barbering, private investigation, notary public, insurance adjuster); 
possible loss of, or ineligibility for public employment.").  It should be noted that many of 
these licenses are solely state-given, which brings up another oddity uncovered in 
California’s proposed legislation.  An arrest is an arrest, a conviction is a conviction, 
whether state or federally proffered.  But if California has legalized marijuana, will those 
with a federal arrest or conviction be barred from state licenses such as these? 
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and success of minority communities, legalization of marijuana may be 
quite hazardous. 
While one might argue that collateral work-related sanctions are 
equally abusive, other collateral sanctions exist that hurt minorities on a 
much harsher level:  Students attending college on the basis of a federal 
loan or grant could lose their access to money for a year if they are 
convicted of possession or use, and for life if convicted of selling;155 food 
stamps or welfare assistance could be denied or revoked;156 eligibility or 
occupancy of public housing could be denied.157  Each of these collateral 
sanctions affects minorities on a much worse level, stripping from them 
things of survival that the white majority simply has little worry to lose.  
Finally, collateral sanctions unassociated with a federal arrest are still out 
there, such as badges of workplace inferiority,158 self-depreciating 
                                                                                                                 
 155. 20 U.S.C. § 109(r)(1) (2006); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG 
OFFENDERS:  VARIOUS FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR 
DENIAL OF SELECTED BENEFITS, No. GAO-05-238 at 12 (Sept. 2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05238.pdf (finding that approximately 17,000 to 20,000 persons 
lose access to Pell Grants and 29,000 to 41,000 lose access to student loans every year).  Ironically 
the loss of student aid only applies to drug convictions, so theoretically, past convicted murders or 
rapists could be eligible for federal student aid but not a person arrested for marijuana possession 
in a state where it is legal.  See BOIRE, supra note 97, at 10. 
 156. 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2006) ("An individual convicted (under Federal or State law) 
of any offense which is classified as a felony . . . which has as an element the possession, 
use, or distribution of a controlled substance . . . shall not be eligible for (1) assistance under 
any State program funded under part A of title IV of the Social Security Act, or (2) benefits 
under the food stamp program . . . ."). 
 157. 20 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2006) ("[A]ny drug-related criminal activity on or off 
such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s 
household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for 
termination of tenancy.").  Notably the Supreme Court has implied that a conviction need not 
happen in order for eviction to take place.  See Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 
535 U.S. 125, 128  (2002) ("Section 1437d(l)(6) requires lease terms that give local public 
housing authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the 
household or a guest engages in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, 
or should of known, of the drug-related activity." (emphasis added)).  What is striking about 
this case is that the appellants had lost their tenancy because their grandson had been caught 
smoking marijuana in the parking lot of their apartment complex.  Imagine Rucker being 
decided in California’s proposed legalized environment.  Now the appellants’ grandson 
(assuming he is of age) would be smoking marijuana in the parking lot legally under state 
law, free from state law punishment.  Yet this man, although partaking in an activity he now 
understands as perfectly legal, would still risk the eviction of his grandparents from their 
federal public housing whether they knew of his smoking pot or not.  Only an eradication of 
federal law and an overruling of United States Supreme Court precedent would relieve 
Californians from this contradictory predicament.  California’s proposal makes no effort to 
do so. 
 158. See SCHWENK & RHODES, supra note 123, at 139 ("Beliefs about the effects of 
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acceptance of being a marijuana smoker,159 or denial of health 
insurance.160
E.  Will Legalization Predispose Minority Youth for Future Use? 
If there is one thing the California ballot initiative proclaimed, it was 
its dedication to prevent underage children from accessing marijuana.161
Besides fining anyone who sells or distributes marijuana to minors,162 the 
initiative dedicated a special marijuana fee, the proceeds of which would 
solely benefit marijuana educational programs: 
Any amount required to be paid to the state under this [fee] shall be paid 
to the board in the form of a remittance payable to the State Board of 
Equalization.  The board shall transmit the payments to the Treasurer to 
be deposited in the Drug Abuse Prevention Supplemental Funding 
Account, which is hereby created in the General Fund.  Upon 
appropriation by the Legislature, the moneys in the fund shall be 
expended exclusively for drug education, awareness, and rehabilitation 
programs under the jurisdiction of the Department of Alcohol and Drug 
Programs, or any successor to that agency.163
Unfortunately, classroom education has been found highly ineffective 
as a tool for preventing marijuana use.164  Instead, personal characteristics 
                                                                                                                 
marijuana on job performance may become self-fulfilling prophesies.  If employers believe 
that marijuana users are poor workers, and establish employment policies favoring nonusers, 
then users may in fact become poorer workers."). 
 159. See id. at 137 (finding that a significant percentage of continuation students—
students who had failed levels of school—believed that their marijuana use would weaken 
their intelligence, indicating that one’s belief of marijuana might affect them worse than 
marijuana’s tangible consequences). 
 160. See, e.g., Randy Cohen, Smoke Screen, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 15, 2010, available 
at  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/magazine/17FOB-ethicist-t.html?emc=tnt&tntemai 
l0=y (responding to a letter requesting advice on how to answer health insurance form 
inquiries into marijuana smoking when that will surely (and eventually did) result in a denial 
of health insurance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 161. See Marijuana Control Act § 1(c) (proclaiming the intent of the Legislature in 
enacting the Act to "regulate marijuana in order to more effectively limit access to marijuana 
by minors").
 162. See Marijuana Control Act § 11726(b) ("Providing or selling marijuana to, or 
purchasing or cultivating marijuana for a person under 21 years of age is an infraction, 
punishable by a fine of up to one hundred dollars.").  A minor in possession of marijuana 
also will be subject to a $100 fine.  Id. § 11726(d). 
 163. Id. § 34031. 
 164. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG CONTROL:  OBSERVATIONS ON 
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such as strong families, religion, or other commitments have the strongest 
effect on preventing marijuana use in our country’s youth.165  Thus, the 
California initiative’s marijuana fee, while perhaps a worthy intention, 
would have been a lackluster mechanism for deterring young people from 
using marijuana. 
Another pro-legalization argument concerning the issue of increased 
child use is that regulating marijuana will eliminate the black market, 
rendering marijuana as unattainable for young people as it is for them to 
purchase alcohol.166  This argument, however, lacks persuasiveness, 
because 1) the black market will not simply dissolve,167 2) legal marijuana 
poses a much higher likelihood of children getting marijuana from parents 
or relatives,168 and 3) under the California initiative parents with underage 
children would not even have been prohibited from growing their own pot, 
and could thus provide children with firsthand access to the drug and its 
                                                                                                                 
ELEMENTS OF THE FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, No. GA:/GGD-97-42, at 1, 3 (1997), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97042.pdf (documenting heavy drug use 
despite drug control activities). 
 165. See generally id.
 166. See LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., 1 MONITORING THE FUTURE:  NATIONAL SURVEY 
RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975–2007, at 208, available at http://www.monitoring 
thefuture.org/pubs/ monographs/vol1_2007.pdf (finding that eighty-four percent of twelfth 
graders report that marijuana is "fairly" or "very" easy to obtain); but see id. ("The great 
majority of teens also see alcohol as readily available:  in 2007, 62% of 8th  graders, 83% of 
10th graders, and 92% of 12th graders said it would be ‘fairly easy’ or ‘very easy’ to get.").  
Thus, perhaps the most comprehensive study about youth and drug availability undercuts the 
argument that regulated marijuana would be less easy to obtain, because regulated alcohol is 
already easier to obtain than unregulated marijuana. 
 167. As previously noted, legalization and regulation of marijuana will not necessarily 
eliminate the black market.  See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  Further, the black 
market would have even more incentive to target young people if their adult business is cut 
into because of legalized pot stores. 
 168. Furthermore, even if the black market ceased to exist there always remains the 
opportunity for parents, older siblings, or older friends to supply the drug, as this colorful 
anecdote relates: 
Shawnda thought about it.  Before she could decide, April said, ‘Hey, my 
parents share a joint every night after being stressed with work all day and it 
mellows them right out!’ Shawnda said, ‘Do your parents smoke in front of 
you?’ April said.  ‘Sure, how do you think I got this stuff?’ Shawnda thought 
again and reached for the joint, figuring that if it was cool for April’s mom and 
dad, then it was cool for her. 
JAMES & JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 61.  While this account is somewhat plastic, it does 
bring up a peculiar issue with the marijuana smoking of parents.  While it is somewhat easy 
to drink in front of one’s child, what kind of message will it tell children, who are being 
"educated" by California’s new programs, when they see their father and mother ripping 
bong tokes after work? 
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source.169  Moreover, these facts only exacerbate the worthlessness of any 
educational program instituted by the marijuana fee.170
Finally, and perhaps most damning to the California legalization bill, 
high school student marijuana use is actually decreasing.171  The prospect of 
making marijuana legal, albeit regulated like alcohol, would be tantamount 
to "making marijuana use another badge of adulthood [that] would increase 
its attractiveness to adolescents."172  The fight for many minority parents is 
to put their children in schools and communities where they will not be 
exposed to drugs, crime, and the like.  If marijuana use is actually 
decreasing in our nation’s high schools, all parents—and especially those 
who are minorities in low income areas—should be wary of its legalization. 
While increased use in the adult community may be an acceptable 
tradeoff for the ills of prohibition, even the writers of the California bill 
viewed increased use by young people as unacceptable.  Because studies 
"suggest that reducing the use of marijuana in a culture is a relatively 
straightforward . . . matter of changing the values among members of the 
society," it would appear then that the values within U.S. high school 
students are changing.173  If that is true, then legalizing marijuana for adult 
use could possibly be a value-shaking statement to our youth, destroying 
their current antismoking trend. 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Originally, the Marijuana Control Act specifically stated that "[t]he presence of 
persons younger than 21 years of age in a household does not affect the lawfulness of the 
cultivation of marijuana [at one’s residence]."  Marijuana Control, Regulation, and 
Education Act, Assem. B. 390, at § 11725(f) (as amended by Ammiano, Jan. 4, 2010), 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab_390_bill 
_20090223_ introduced.pdf (emphasis added).  While such blatantly "non-criminalizing" 
words were noticeably deleted from the updated version of the Act, no provision has been 
included to make such behavior illegal.  See generally Marijuana Control Act § 11725. 
 170. For example, the following scenario would be quite possible:  a teenager comes 
home from a high school that has just "educated" her concerning the ills of marijuana to a 
home with a backyard full of marijuana plants. 
 171. See JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 166, at 208 tbl.5–5a (showing that although 
marijuana is the most used illegal substance among high school students, there has been a 
general decline in its use over the past decade among those students); see also NATIONAL 
DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 18, at 17 ("[R]ates of past year use for adolescents 
aged 12 to 17 declined from 15.0 percent in 2003 to 12.5 percent in 2007.  [Further] data 
shows that the rates of past year use among eighth, tenth, and twelfth graders have decreased 
overall since 2003."). 
 172. KLEIMAN, supra note 6, at 275. 
 173. SCHWENK & RHODES, supra note 123, at 142. 
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V.  Conclusion 
In this country, marijuana has always been attached with underlying 
symbolism.  "So long as people are reacting to the symbolic content of 
marijuana use, they will regard marijuana smoking as morally wrong.  And 
as long as they regard marijuana smoking as morally wrong, at least some 
of them will seek the aid of the law to prohibit the activity."174  Minority 
groups must understand that the symbolic history of marijuana, and 
therefore its moral history, has roots strongly tied with racism, xenophobia, 
and class oppression.  In the face of the potential legalization of this drug 
through legislation similar to or modeled after California’s Marijuana 
Control, Regulation, and Education Act, minority groups must personally 
consider the likely outcomes such legalization would have in their 
communities. 
When Mexicans and West Indians first brought marijuana into this 
country, it became steadily entrenched in outrageous tales of story and 
fiction, egged on by a pervasive fear and resentment of racial and ethnic 
minorities.  When white young adults, in the 1960s and 1970s, began using 
marijuana en masse, an utter lack of scientific research and study of the 
drug confronted the nation and its political leaders.  Yet, the disdainful 
image of marijuana prevailed and its prohibition grew even stronger. 
Today, the consequences of marijuana prohibition seem far worse than 
the actual effect of the drug.  The black community, which has felt these 
consequences at a disproportional rate, now lacks many of its young adults 
because they have simply possessed or smoked pot.  Rather than 
contributing something to their community, these individuals remain locked 
away in jail cells contributing nothing.  California’s Marijuana Control, 
Regulation, and Education Act proposed to solve these and other problems 
by legalizing marijuana. 
Yet, on closer inspection, California’s bill, while potentially solving 
some harms, seems to create new ones.  Because the prohibition of 
marijuana in this country is inextricably tied to the heritage of racial and 
ethnic minority groups, these groups must analyze the California bill and 
others like it so as to not once again be disserved by a legislative 
mechanism.  Therefore, minority groups should look to how the legalization 
of marijuana will affect their neighborhoods, their children, their 
economies, and their safety.  While inequality exemplifies the current 
                                                                                                                 
 174. THE NEW PROHIBITION, supra note 85, at 17. 
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situation, minority groups may find that legalization of marijuana, under 
California’s terms, would provide nothing better than a history repeated. 
Perhaps minority groups should seek other solutions.  Perhaps 
minorities should create an initiative maintaining marijuana prohibition, but 
rather than incarcerating its violators, promising to rehabilitate them with 
treatment.175  Maybe, as Mark Kleiman suggests, minorities could lobby for 
a qualified form of legalization in which consumers could only buy pot with 
a highly-monitored personal license.176  Or, perhaps, the California 
initiative is perfectly workable and would in fact rescue minority 
communities from their struggles with the current state of law.  Whatever 
the proper solution may be, the class oppressive history of marijuana 
prohibition in this country has hurt minority groups in lasting ways.  
Heeding that history and its effects, minority groups must be ready to voice 
their opinions, thoughts, and suggestions in the face of the potential 
legalization of marijuana in the states of this country. 
                                                                                                                 
 175. See GERBER, supra note 44, at 64 (explaining the proposition to replace drug 
incarceration with treatment in hopes of rehabilitating addicts and users). 
 176. See KLEIMAN, supra note 6, at 277 ("A personal license to use marijuana with a 
quantity limit could help remedy [marijuana legalization] failures without imposing 
unworkable administrative burdens or greatly expanding the market for illicitly produced 
marijuana."). 
